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AbstrAct: this article provides a much-needed introduction to the philosophical debates around 
nihilism and negative thought which preoccupied many italian left intellectuals in the seventies, 
and which still have important repercussions today. in order to present the principal stakes of 
the ‘left heideggerian’ current, the article undertakes a close reading of massimo Cacciari’s 
1976 book Krisis, and of antonio negri’s critical response to it—first in a review of the book, 
and then in a number of texts from the seventies and eighties, closely analysed by mandarini, in 
which negri develops a positive political metaphysics. this contrast between Cacciari and negri 
allows mandarini to investigate the significance of seemingly recondite philosophical issues to 
the development of italian radical political thought, and to identify some of the key stakes of this 
debate: the status of politics and the political, the role of ontology, the place of dialectics and, 
crucially, the opposition between Cacciari’s formalistic understanding of negativity and negri’s 
link between negativity and antagonism.
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in the context of this seminar, the term ‘metaphysics’ indicates the tradition 
of thought that conceives of the self-founding of being as negative foundation. 
whether or not an integrally and immediately positive metaphysics is possible 
(such as the one that … a. negri finds in spinoza), remains an open question. 
(agamben, Language and Death)
i
for metaphysics, the foundation is that upon which being rests, it is the foundation 
(Grund) that allows being to take place. But, ‘as much as being takes place in the nonplace 
of the foundation (that is, in nothingness), being is the unfounded (Das Grundlose)’.1 
     1. giorgio agamben, Language and Death: The Place of  Negativity, trans. Karen e. Pinkus with michael hardt, 
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italian philosophy from the late 1960s to the 1980s—but this is by no means over—
stitched a line leading from schopenhauer and nietzsche through to wittgenstein and 
heidegger that wove together Das Grundlose of being with the trajectory of nihilism. the 
very different theoretical and political backgrounds of the participants in these debates 
takes nothing away from the overall tendency to transfigure the foundation by stripping 
down being and, ultimately, authorising philosophical mysticism and political oppor-
tunism.2 the very real differences of the resulting positions—hermeneutical free-play, 
decentred community, or formalist decisionism3—cannot override the ultimate end of 
these tendencies: to provide a political (and rational) foundation for mysticism in terms 
of the immanent production of a merely residual, liminal negativity. it is these tenden-
cies that i group together under the label of ‘left-heideggerianism’—in recognition of 
their principal philosophical predecessor.4
what i propose to do here is to not detail the rich diversity of the theoretical trajec-
tories of left-heideggerianism in italian philosophy over the past thirty or so years—a 
daunting task and certainly not one to be attempted in a short article such as this. i 
intend, instead, to make some preliminary notes on something that has been largely 
overlooked in the discussion of recent italian thought: i.e. the debate around the pro-
vocative assertions of italian Krisis-thought. at the centre of this debate is massimo Cac-
ciari’s Krisis. Saggio sulla crisi del pensiero negativo da Nietzsche a Wittgenstein published in 1976. 
that Cacciari’s text was central to the development of a number of subsequent tenden-
cies in italian philosophy, political theory and political practice, is attested to by its influ-
ence on the development of ‘weak thought’ (pensiero debole) and, more importantly, on the 
notion of the ‘autonomy of the political’ as adopted by some of the leading intellectuals of 
the italian Communist Party—amongst whom one must number Cacciari himself. an-
tonio negri’s critical review of this work in the italian journal aut aut, which sparked the 
debate, did not conclude in any resolution or compromise between the contrasting po-
minneapolis, university of minnesota Press, 1991, pp. xiii—translation modified. also see giorgio agam-
ben, Il linguaggio e la morte. Un seminario sul luogo della negatività, turin, einaudi, 1982, p. 6.
     2. By ‘mysticism’ i mean something very specific, as i hope will become apparent in the ensuing discus-
sion. 
     3. i am tempted to include agamben’s image of the camp as the nómos of the modern and his notion of 
‘bare life’. the failure of agamben’s later project stems, as negri argues convincingly in two recent essays, 
from the ontological indetermination, passivity and unproductivity of ‘bare life’ and not from a nihilistic 
foundation that he did so much to uncover in his earlier work. on this see: agamben, Language and Death: 
The Place of  Negativity, giorgio agamben, Homo sacer. Il potere sovrano e la nuda vita, turin, einaudi, 1995, 
giorgio agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. daniel heller-roazen, stanford, stanford 
university Press, 1998, antonio negri, ‘the Political subject and absolute immanence’, in Creston davis, 
John milbank and slavoj Žižek (eds.), Theology and the Political: The New Debate, trans. matteo mandarini, 
durham, duke university Press, 2005, pp. xii, 476 p, antonio negri, ‘giorgio agamben: the discreet taste 
of the dialectic’, in matthew Calarco and steven deCaroli (eds.), Sovereignty and Life: Essays on the Work of  
Giorgio Agamben, trans. matteo mandarini, stanford, stanford university Press, 2006. whether or not that 
saves agamben from mysticism, i.e. from the re-establishment of a formal transcendence within imma-
nence (and not in terms of a negative foundation that is the focus of this paper), remains, i would contend, 
‘an open question’. 
     4. i owe this label to antonio negri.
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sitions. it did, however, serve to mark the point of irreducible conflict between two ten-
dencies within italian communist philosophy and politics. this debate cannot, then, be 
considered to be merely an incidental result of a review written for the italian journal aut 
aut in 1976. rather, it is fundamental to an understanding italian philosophy and politics 
in a critical period of italy’s political and social history. it is also, something on which i 
shall focus in the second half of this paper, the point of convergence for a series of themes 
and problems that would be central to negri’s thought from that moment forth.
after discussing Cacciari’s extraordinary book Krisis, i shall focus on a few selected 
texts of negri’s from the 1970s and early-to-mid 1980s. these challenge the specifically 
subtractive twist given to the Krisis of the foundation and they set the stage for negri’s 
continuing endeavour to develop a positive metaphysics which refuses Das Grundlose of 
Being (i.e. the determination of Being as negative foundation). 
ii
massimo Cacciari, with whom negri collaborated closely in the 1960s, was—along with 
mario tronti—instrumental in theorising the shift towards the ‘autonomy of the politi-
cal’ as the political consequence of Das Grundlose of Being.
is it necessary, therefore, to make of marxism the recovered philosophical 
foundation of science? But what does this foundation have to say to us today? is it 
not, rather, a new dimension of politics that marxism is able to open up for us—not 
in terms of a ‘philosophy’ of politics but as a ‘will to power’ exerted concretely over 
the multiplicity of languages of technology? does one respond to heidegger’s and 
nietzsche’s thought through ‘philosophy’, appealing once again to subjects, writing 
yet another meta-physical utopia for them? or does one respond by starting to 
abandon the rafts and ladders and penetrating, without emergency exits, into the 
politics of technology, scientific research and into the infinite aporias of the ‘social 
brain’?5
Cacciari’s penetrating critique of the dialectic in the late 1960s and his analysis of a ‘neg-
ative thought’ that precludes any possible synthesis turned, in the 1970s, into an analysis 
of the means for the technocratic construction of ‘new orders’, founded on nothingness 
and crisis—a ‘revolution from above’ for the management of development by the rep-
resentatives of the working class (i.e. through italian Communist Party’s control of the 
levers of political power). it is to this shift that we shall turn first. 
iii
the form of the dialectic is the form of the negative that is affirmed positively—
the recoverable contradiction. the whole system posits itself and maintains itself in 
     5. Cacciari’s article in Rinascita quoted in amedeo Vigorelli, ‘noi, i soggetti e il “politico”. a proposito di 
Bisogni e teoria’, aut aut, no. 155-156, 1976, pp. 196-203, pp. 196-7. Rinascita was the cultural and theoretical 
journal of the italian Communist Party (PCi). see massimo Cacciari, ‘noi, i soggetti’, Rinascita, no. 27, 2 
July 1976.
Cosmos and history40
terms [nel segno] of negativity: a movement of universal alienation is the true-real 
[vera-reale] totality.6
for Cacciari (and negri) the hegelian dialectic represents the highpoint in the victori-
ous and expansive cycle of capitalist development, in which all contradictions, all con-
flicts are turned directly into productive moments of capital’s advance as the self-reali-
sation of spirit. everything becomes a moment of the production-consumption circuit 
of Kapital-Geist; the negative—in the form of ‘determinate negation’—is the engine but it 
is an always already disciplined moment. that is, it is systemic and, hence, an integral 
moment—always presaging its disappearance—in the circuit of Geist. 
in contrast to this ‘virtuous’ dialectic is the ‘negative thought’ developed in the nine-
teenth century by bourgeois theorists such as schopenhauer, nietzsche and mach, and 
in the twentieth century by wittgenstein and heidegger amongst others. Cacciari coins 
the term ‘negative thought’ in the late 1960s so as to precisely differentiate it from the 
positivisation of the negative that characterizes the dialectic. negative thought begins 
by resisting all attempts by bourgeois ideology to pre-determine and synthesize. how-
ever, the role that the negative plays here is by no means straightforward. the negative 
is no longer immanent in the same way. it is no longer a moment of advance, no longer 
a dynamic moment produced and consumed at once. Cacciari claims that the process 
of alienation and recovery of Kapital-Geist, which makes itself at home in a world it pro-
duces, a world that it expels from itself only to re-appropriate more fully, is over. the 
negative now surrounds; it delimits and constrains but in so doing, it renders reality all 
the more ‘ready-to-hand’. the absolute master, death now marks the outer perimeter 
of one’s being and throws one back onto one’s own-most possibilities, opening up an (in-
strumental) world for us and determining new orders to re-found the unfounded. the 
negative persists only in this paradoxical, marginal position that is the very condition of 
immanence but which, as we shall see, renders the mystical worldly—and the worldly 
mystical.7
Cacciari refuses to identify the mystical experience in the early wittgenstein, for in-
stance, with that of transcendence, on the ground that mysticism is—rather—the expe-
rience of (this side of) the limit (…of language, of my world…). it is the experience that 
the world is de-limited, hence, that it is ‘radically worldly’.8 he argues that the mystical 
should be opposed to the ‘profound’, on the basis that the profound is the un-sayable 
that one attempts to say—such as the attempt to provide a presentation (Darstellung) of 
     6. massimo Cacciari, ‘sulla genesi del pensiero negativo’, Contropiano, vol. 1, 1969, p. 131.
     7. mysticism is most obvious in the work of schopenhauer and his denial of the will, in wittgenstein’s 
Tractatus it appears explicitly, as itself, and it is there in heidegger’s ‘guilt’ and ‘call of conscience’. Cacciari 
shows precisely how these examples are more than merely suggestive of the mystical and to what extent 
they actually develop a thinking of the limit as the definition of the mystical. the link i allude to between 
hegel and heidegger’s conception of death is drawn from what is perhaps agamben’s most brilliant book, 
Il linguaggio e la morte.
     8. massimo Cacciari, Krisis. Saggio sulla crisi del pensiero negativo da Nietzsche a Wittgenstein, milan, feltrinelli, 
1976, p. 95, massimo Cacciari, Dallo Steinhof. Prospettive viennesi del primo Novecento, milan, adelphi, 1980, pp. 
135-40, massimo Cacciari, Posthumous People: Vienna at the Turning Point, trans. r. friedman, stanford, stan-
ford university Press, 1996, pp. 97-101.
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the noumenon. instead, the mystical stems from negative thought’s excision of all refer-
ence to a ‘real world’ transcending the limits of language and that, thereby, enables a 
multiplicity of technics to internalize those very limits, autonomising themselves in a va-
riety of specific ‘language games’.9 they do so does so to make the world sayable, for-
mulable and, so, to make it ready-to-hand as a function of a will to Power. negative 
thought is not, then, the attempt to express the inexpressible, to reach the unconditioned 
or absolute—an aim so prevalent in the history of metaphysics. negative thought at-
tacks all synthesis, all equilibrium and all reference: the real world becomes a fable, be-
comes ideological. the world’s limits coincide with the limits of language, of what can 
be formulated. ‘our language games cannot be “situated” [appaesabili] ontologically’.10 
negri summarizes this as follows:
nietzsche’s and wittgenstein’s work … is reconceived in terms of a formal and 
negative thought but that is, thanks to the combination of the two elements, also 
constructive. it is constructive of logical and systemic horizons within which 
the efficacy of signification [significativa] is reduced entirely to the validity of the 
project, to the coherent rule of linguistic development [alla regola coerente dello 
sviluppo linguistico] and of the formal intention that constitutes it.11
thus, for Cacciari, the rational lacks all exogenous foundation. there is no Ratio to be 
sought in the world—all we have is a proliferation of rationalities, of ‘language games’, 
of ideological structures irreducible one to another, that are circumscribed by a noth-
ingness. this is succinctly summarized by giuseppe Cantarano’s phrase, ‘reason is ni-
hilism inasmuch as it is the historical project of  the annihilation [annientamento] of  being’.12 
hence the indissoluble link between the ‘mystical’—as described by Cacciari—and the 
mathematization, formalization of reality.
this is how the essence of the ‘mystical’ appears [suona]. it is the simple description, 
which has been able to fully internalize its limits and that contains and shows 
[mostra] the nothing that embraces it, without saying any of it [senza dirne un solo 
accento].13 
     9. for Cacciari’s discussion of the opposition between the mystical and the profound, see Krisis. Saggio sulla 
crisi del pensiero negativo da Nietzsche a Wittgenstein, p. 112.
     10. massimo Cacciari, ‘“razionalità” e “irrazionalità” nella critica del Politico in deleuze e foucault’, aut 
aut, no. 161, 1977, pp. 119-33, p. 132.
     11. antonio negri, La macchina tempo. Rompicapi Liberazione Costituzione, milan, feltrinelli, 1982, p. 41. this 
review essay was first published in the journal aut aut, nos. 155-156, 1976, with the title ‘Simplex sigillum veri. 
Per la discussione di Krisis e Bisogni e teoria marxista’. it was then reprinted in 1982, with the title ‘sul metodo 
della crisi filosofica’, as chapter 2 of La macchina tempo.
     12. giuseppe Cantarano, Immagini del nulla. La filosofia italiana contemporanea, milan, Bruno mondatori, 1998, 
p. 319.
     13. Cacciari, Krisis. Saggio sulla crisi del pensiero negativo da Nietzsche a Wittgenstein, p. 112. Cacciari argues that, 
for all the differences that exist between the wittgenstein of the Tractatus and that of the Investigations, it is 
precisely the notion of the mystical which opens the way for the development of the concept of language 
games, by effectively isolating the process of formalisation—reducing logical propositions to tautologies—
and, thus, preventing the referent from acting as a unitary point of synthesis for the multiplicity of language 
games.
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we can formulate and manipulate this ‘conventional’ world, precisely because the world 
is nothing but what can be formulated, beyond that is nothing, which circumscribes 
and conditions without itself being said: ‘“behind” the different games there is nothing’.14 
here nietzsche, wittgenstein and heidegger are indissolubly linked: will to power, for-
malization of language and metaphysics as the reduction of Being to (formulated) be-
ings—technology and power. this is summed up in one of Cacciari’s most memorable 
and unsettling phrases: ‘[to have] power is to be integrated into the system’.15
Cacciari’s political programme rests precisely on such a de-ontologized, even skel-
etal, grasp of actuality (Wirklichkeit). how else is the autonomy of the political to be 
understood if not as the decisionistic management of the multiplicity of fragmentary 
rationalities, as the working class—in the form of the PCi—taking control of the admin-
istration of the state, making up for a ‘deficiency in rationalisation … the inefficiency of 
the political apparatus’?16 Political decisionism or, more precisely, voluntarist formalism 
situates itself in the place of the negative. 
also because we are not speaking of the autonomy of a part of  power in relation to 
other parts; but of the autonomy of all of  power with respect to everything else that 
is not power; that is, to the rest of society. hence, the autonomy of power with 
respect to what is or, better still, what was or was considered—generally—the 
foundation of power.17 
in place of the foundation, then, we have the beginning of command over a process of 
rationalisation. the space of the Political is the space between language games, which 
negotiates their insoluble autonomy—which supports the negative that, in turn, deter-
mines their self-sufficiency.
let us, therefore, understand the autonomy of each technology, of each game, 
to mean that it possesses only one-law-of-its-own [una-propria-legge] (which is the 
result of an infinity of variations, which has been played and re-played, which is 
transformable and in-transformation because it is played). let us understand the 
term ‘autonomy’ in this sense of limit.18
Paraphrasing sergio givone, it is only once one has abandoned faith in a political sub-
ject as foundation of revolutionary political change that one can rediscover a profes-
sional political class that can take over the administration of the actual to bring change 
from above:19
     14. massimo Cacciari, ‘Critica della “autonomia” e problema del politico’, in V.f. ghisi (ed.), Crisi del sapere 
e nuova razionalità, Bari, de donato, 1978, pp. 123-35, p. 131.
     15. Cacciari, Krisis. Saggio sulla crisi del pensiero negativo da Nietzsche a Wittgenstein, p. 66.
     16. mario tronti, Sull’autonomia del politico, milano, feltrinelli, 1977, p. 11.
     17. tronti, Sull’autonomia del politico, p. 9.
     18. Cacciari, ‘Critica della “autonomia” e problema del politico’, p. 130.
     19. technically Cacciari would be correct in refusing to see the activity of the PCi as coming ‘from above’ 
since his account in Krisis refuses any pre-determined hierarchy. on the other hand, by—along with mario 
tronti—viewing political power as something fundamentally independent from the ‘rest of society’ (tronti, 
Sull’autonomia del politico) and arguing for the need for the PCi to garner that power in order to effect political 
change, the space for the autonomy of state-driven political processes is prepared. this argument is central 
to negri’s philosophical and political critique of the autonomy of the political and Krisis-thought.
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the decision is preceded or pre-comprehended [precompreso] by nothing. 
nothingness is the foundation of the decision.20
to what extent, then, does Cacciari succeed in escaping the metaphysical closure 
through this refusal of the ontological foundation produced by the saturation of ration-
alities in nothingness? this question is answered by giorgio agamben in his early book, 
Language and Death:
today we live on that extreme fringe of metaphysics where it returns—as nihilism—
to its own negative foundation (to its own Ab-grund, to its own unfoundedness). if 
casting the foundation into the abyss does not, however, reveal the ethos, the proper 
dwelling of humanity, but is limited to demonstrating the abyss of Sigē [silence], 
then metaphysics has not been surpassed, but reigns in its most absolute form.21 
for the structure that defines metaphysical reflection on Being (including heidegger’s—
as agamben shows so well), stems not so much from foundationalism as such, as from self-
founding as negative foundation. for heidegger, being destines but withdraws behind 
that which it destines. this withdrawal, the fact that being opens a clearing but recedes 
behind that which it clears, is analogous to the mystical as Cacciari describes it. we 
could argue that Cacciari repeats the logic of transcendence through the fabrication of a 
negative foundation (the mystical limit encircled by nothingness). it is no use his claim-
ing that the mystical does not found the world but merely delimits it, that there is no re-
ceding being, for his actuality—the set of rationalities, of new rationalized orders—is 
nevertheless borne, supported by the nothing that surrounds the limits of the various 
language games in their very being formulated. in so doing the infinite movement of 
immanence is contained and constrained and we are left with the manipulation of dead 
terms by professional technicians of actuality. 
Before unpacking the consequence of these manoeuvres it is important to explore 
this relation to heidegger a little further.
iV
in ‘what is metaphysics?’, and in the famous 1943 ‘Postscript’, heidegger does more 
than flirt with the identity of Being and nothingness:
as that which is altogether other than all beings, being is that which is not. But 
this nothing essentially prevails as being … we must prepare ourselves solely in 
readiness to experience in the nothing the pervasiveness of that which gives every 
being the warrant to be. that is being itself.22
nihilation is not some fortuitous incident. rather, as the repelling gesture toward 
     20. sergio givone, Storia del nulla, Bari, laterza, 1995, p. xxi. i would like to thank alberto toscano for 
bringing this important, although very problematic, book to my attention.
     21. agamben, Language and Death: The Place of  Negativity, p. 53. also see agamben, Il linguaggio e la morte. Un 
seminario sul luogo della negatività, p. 67.
     22. martin heidegger, ‘Postscript to “what is metaphysics?”’, Pathmarks, ed. and trans. william mcneill, 
Cambridge, Cambridge university Press, 1998, p. 233.
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beings as a whole in their slipping away, it manifests these beings in their full 
heretofore concealed strangeness as what is radically other—with respect to the 
nothing.23
heidegger refuses to render nothingness unthinkable, as has occurred in the metaphysi-
cal tradition since Parmenides, but he does so only by conjoining being and nothing. 
whether he does this by presenting the ‘occurrence of nihilation in the essence of Being 
itself ’24 or by claiming that ‘nothingness appears to be the foundation of being’25—in 
two rival formulations that are closer than at first appears given givone’s concession 
that the being ‘that is preceded by nothing, that is determined by nothing … at bottom 
[in fondo] is like nothing’26—heidegger is unable to fully satisfy Cacciari’s demand that 
the nothing not be positivized. Cacciari’s response is to forget being and heidegger’s 
nothing (das Nichts), and to affirm in a perverse appropriation of heidegger—and yet 
against him—the ‘actuality of the actual’ (die Wirklichkeit des Wirklichen).27 Cacciari’s idea 
is to turn the negative, not into a positive element of language-games, but into their re-
sidual, produced condition. it is at once inactive, derived, and foundational. to fully 
pervert this appropriation, Cacciari affirms what has been best described by heidegger 
as ‘exact thinking’ against the latter’s demand for ‘essential thinking’:28
all calculation lets what is countable be resolved into something that can then be 
used for subsequent counting. Calculation refuses to let anything appear except 
what is countable. everything is only whatever it counts. what has been counted 
in each instance secures the continuity of counting. such counting progressively 
consumes numbers and is itself continual self-consumption. the calculative 
process of resolving beings into what has been counted counts as an explanation 
of their being …. Calculative thinking compels itself into a compulsion to master 
everything on the basis of the consequential correctness of its procedure.29
one final lengthy quotation from heidegger’s ‘Postscript’ i hope will confirm my inter-
pretation of Cacciari’s peculiar faithfulness to heidegger:
understood as a fundamental trait of the beingness of beings, ‘will’ is the equating 
of beings with the actual, in such a way that the actuality of the actual comes 
to power in the unconditional attainment of pervasive objectification …. as a 
way of objectifying beings in a calculative manner, modern science is a condition 
posited by the will to will itself, through which the will secures the dominance of 
its essence.30 
     23. martin heidegger, ‘what is metaphysics?’, in william mcneill (ed.), Pathmarks, trans. david f. Krell, 
Cambridge, Cambridge university Press, 1998, p. 90.
     24. dennis J. schmidt, The Ubiquity of  the Finite: Hegel, Heidegger, and the Entitlements of  Philosophy, Cambridge, 
mit Press, 1988, p. 90.
     25. givone, Storia del nulla, p. 200.
     26. givone, Storia del nulla, p. 205.
     27. heidegger, ‘Postscript to “what is metaphysics?”’, p. 231.
     28. heidegger, ‘Postscript to “what is metaphysics?”’, p. 235-6.
     29. heidegger, ‘Postscript to “what is metaphysics?”’, p. 235.
     30. heidegger, ‘Postscript to “what is metaphysics?”’, p. 231.
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Precisely the denial of a natural Ratio, of any structuring Aufhebung, means—for Cacciari 
—that there is no pre-given ought (Sollen), whether ethical or logical, by which irreduc-
ible heterogeneity can be reduced or can be reconciled once and for all, but only Wille 
zur Macht as the:
… vital necessity to com-prehend, order [sistemare], logicize the world, to have power 
over it …. Power is not synthesis—were it synthesis, there would no longer be any 
need for power.31
as negri makes clear, what we are then left with is a calculable and manipulable set 
of elements, circumscribed by nothingness that delimits the serialized elements into 
language-games or rationalisation procedures, all of which are organized by a political 
decisionism—will to Power, will to rationalisation— that determines the:
… historical necessity … of a political class and a professional political class to 
which the management [gestione] of power is to be entrusted. … in this way arises 
the moment of a war of manoeuvre [guerra manovrata], made-up of successive 
moves, all of which are scientifically calculated [previste] and tactically prepared.32 
we can see, then, how Cacciari’s re-conceptualisation of the notion of ‘mysticism’ serves 
an unsettling political project: to employ ‘mysticism’ for the task of a political technics—
to the point of in-distinction of power and formal/ul-isation, and so to a technocracy of 
political action in which effectiveness is all. this will become the core focus of negri’s 
violent critique. thus, Cacciari’s thought shows a paradoxical adoption and disavowal 
of heidegger. the withdrawal of Being, its retreat, ‘ground[s] … the dimension of being 
in its difference with respect to the entity’.33 as we have seen, for Cacciari, this ontologi-
cal difference results in the advent of language games that confirm that Being has always 
already only ever been understood in terms of beings (although Cacciari severs the ety-
mological link between ‘Being’ and ‘beings’). it is this that permits the reduction of poli-
tics to efficacy, to technology. in other words, we could say that the actual ‘forgetting of 
Being’ in Cacciari is both the condition of and conditioned by ontological difference, 
but for Krisis-thought this ‘forgetting’ frees itself of any sense of loss (or the possibility of 
recollection), such that the forgetting of Being—as the condition for beings to be, to be 
formulated and utilized—is, beyond this—and in contrast to heidegger34—nothing, a 
nothing that circumscribes and (de-)limits, making possible, manipulable. it is as though 
Cacciari asks us to climb up and through heidegger’s propositions on the meaning and 
forgetting of Being, only to then ‘throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it’.35 
what is left is the ontic world of the merely formulated, the calculable world of the will 
     31. Cacciari, Krisis. Saggio sulla crisi del pensiero negativo da Nietzsche a Wittgenstein, p. 65 & 9.
     32. tronti, Sull’autonomia del politico, pp. 17-8.
     33. agamben, Language and Death: The Place of  Negativity, p. 85. also agamben, Il linguaggio e la morte. Un 
seminario sul luogo della negatività, p. 105.
     34. agamben points out that heidegger aims to think Being outside of its relation to beings (i.e. beyond 
metaphysics as he defines it) through the concept of ‘appropriation’ (Ereignis) in his essay ‘time and Being’ in 
martin heidegger, On Time and Being, trans. Joan stambaugh, Chicago, university of Chicago Press, 1972. 
     35. ludwig wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. d. f. Pears and B. f. mcguinness, london, 
routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961, prop. 6.54.
Cosmos and history46
to will, which in being formulated, becomes utilisable.
the different language games co-exist but between them there is no chance of syn-
thesis, no possible ontological resolution but only the persistence of conflict and the 
need to negotiate it:
Reality [Reale] is logicalisation [logicizzazione], rationalisierung, which refuses the 
metaphysics of language, the logic of reductio ad unum, the idea of the substance-
subject—that takes on board the whole weight of the contradictoriness of the 
processes, of the multiplicity of languages, constituting its space and, so, allowing 
its form to emerge.36
on the one hand, the Political is a language game like the others, with its own specific 
rules and immanent possibilities of transformation and, on the other hand, it has other 
language games for its content. the Political then situates itself in such a way as to keep 
the confrontation between the various language games continuously open. it ‘imposes 
this continual confrontation, it prevents any game from withdrawing [sottrarvisi] from 
it’.37 the only possibility is an endless compromise between different autonomies—be-
tween different language games characterized by the laws that specify them.
in Krisis we see the result of negative thought’s refusal to give in to the temptation of 
dialectical resolution, to what Cacciari terms the ‘recoverable contradiction’38 that turns 
all antagonism into a moment of the development of the system of capital. the critique 
of the dialectic by schopenhauer and nietzsche that Cacciari had discussed in his im-
portant essay of 1969, enabled him to pin-point the positivisation of  the negative as what was 
at stake in bourgeois thought. But what Cacciari was after in his 1976 book, through his 
analysis of nietzsche, wittgenstein, etc., was a way of re-conceiving the negative such 
that it would no longer be thought of as a moment by means of which the system devel-
ops itself and to turn it. instead, it develops into a barrier that can be perpetually dis-
placed and consumed as a moment of expansion of domination—of the will to Power. 
Cacciari shows that all preceding notions of the negative end up neutering it, always 
already virtually resolving it—making conflict little more than an epiphenomenal form 
hiding a fundamentally pacific unity. this view of the dialectic as—in its classical he-
gelian form—fundamentally reactionary, is one that negri largely shared with Cacci-
ari.39 however, Cacciari’s solution merely served to confirm the theoretical and political 
break that had already taken place between them.40 
     36. Cacciari, Krisis. Saggio sulla crisi del pensiero negativo da Nietzsche a Wittgenstein, p. 185.
     37. Cacciari, ‘Critica della “autonomia” e problema del politico’, p. 133.
     38. Cacciari, ‘sulla genesi del pensiero negativo’, p. 131.
     39. negri’s own relationship to the dialectic is extremely complex and cannot be easily summarized. his 
peremptory tone when discussing it is quite often misleading, as is the all too hasty suggestion that negri 
refuses the dialectic in a manner analogous to deleuze and foucault. this is both false and—ultimately—
fails to shed light on any of these thinkers’ take on the question. i have discussed negri’s nuanced concep-
tion of the dialectic in mandarini 2005. 
     40. for all the criticisms negri would direct at Krisis-thought, he recognizes the ‘wonderful attempt to 
positively recuperate the efficacy of negative thought’ as late as 1981 (see antonio negri, The Savage Anomaly: 
The Power of  Spinoza’s Metaphysics and Politics, trans. michael hardt, minneapolis, university of minnesota 
Press, 1991, p. 211ff. & n.3). this is well after the vigorous critique directed at Krisis in aut aut and of his 
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V
in this way, a cynical conventionalism—placed between an unstoppable 
[irrefrenabile] logicalising pressure [pulsione] and an hypocritical postulation of the 
mystical—represents the ruling class’s gradual prise de conscience of the passage to 
capital’s real subsumption of social labour and to negate the antagonism that 
sustains [sostanzia] that passage as well as the claim [rivendicazione] to ontological 
truth the social subject expresses.41
the object of this scathing attack is wittgenstein, but it is clear that the name ‘wittgen-
stein’ also denotes negri’s erstwhile collaborator, the author of Krisis. one may, perhaps, 
free the power of the negative from positivisation by consigning it to the role of ‘determin-
ing factor in the process of integration and rationalisation’.42 But is not the result of this 
that the negative becomes domesticated? the process of de-ontologisation, that is, of the 
excision of the referent that allows the multiplicity of formal, conventional rules to be 
deployed, as a pure free-floating technics of manipulation and efficacy, reduces thought 
to what works and, hence, to the apologetic subordination to existing states of affairs 
or—at best—to a ‘fetishistic overdetermination’43 from above, i.e. to ideology and politi-
cal opportunism. once one excises all ontological foundation, power is necessarily de-
fined by the level of integration into the system, by one’s ability to ‘work it’. 
it is not the degree to which one approaches an illusory substance but the degree 
of integration with which it operates in the process of rationalisation [that] decides 
the value and the power of logical form.44
according to Cacciari, substance is illusory, Being is equally so—both represent merely 
utopian moments of synthesis. in their place there is nothing. nothing circumscribes 
and conditions the wholly immanent nature of the conventional, formal rules—thus es-
tablishing the worldliness of the mystical. But, as we have already seen, it is clear that 
this negative foundation, the condition for the ‘concrete search for re-foundation’, does 
not signal an escape from metaphysics or even from a constraining of immanent proc-
esses of change. indeed, that the ‘processes of refoundation’, of formalisation and con-
ventionalisation are constituted as ‘movements internal to the “negative”’,45 is by no means 
evident since the process of formalisation presupposes a negative foundation as denial of 
Being, substance, etc. thus the mystical, the nothing that circumscribes, marks the 
angry tirades against ‘nietzsche in parliament’ (see antonio negri, ‘domination and sabotage’, in timothy 
s. murphy (ed.), Books for Burning: Between Civil War and Democracy in 1970s Italy, trans. e. emery, new york, 
Verso, 2005), which followed the election of Cacciari to the italian parliament in 1976 under Berlinguer’s 
strategy of ‘historic compromise’ between the italian Communist Party and the ruling Christian demo-
crats. it is clear that negri is affirming negative thought’s refusal of dialectical synthesis, of domestication or 
positivisation of the negative. But to stop there, he will argue, is to remain within the formal antinomies of 
thought and to subordinate practice to technocratic negotiation or national compromise.
     41. negri, La macchina tempo. Rompicapi Liberazione Costituzione, p. 33.
     42. Cacciari, Krisis. Saggio sulla crisi del pensiero negativo da Nietzsche a Wittgenstein, p. 8.
     43. negri, La macchina tempo. Rompicapi Liberazione Costituzione, p. 43.
     44. Cacciari, Krisis. Saggio sulla crisi del pensiero negativo da Nietzsche a Wittgenstein, p. 68.
     45. Cacciari, Krisis. Saggio sulla crisi del pensiero negativo da Nietzsche a Wittgenstein, p. 8, my emphasis.
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formal condition for immanence but also delimits the immanent and, in so doing, turns 
the negative into the presupposed product of the very process it must condition. the 
‘movements internal to the “negative”’ may be immanent but the negative remains ab-
stract, unrelated, undetermined and a merely manipulable epiphenomenon.
in short, negri suggests that Cacciari pays a heavy price for having saved the nega-
tive from its positivisation in the development of Capital-Geist—he effectively domes-
ticates it. he has been able to maintain the insolubility of crisis and prevent any easy 
synthesis, but—as negri points out in his 1976 review—he has done so while losing any 
concrete conception of the negative, losing the ability to analyse struggles and ending 
up with a fundamentally domesticated, opportunistic conception of the negative and 
of politics. the problem for this epigone of the autonomy of the political, is that the 
moment of decision and the subject of decision cannot be understood independently 
of the process of rationalisation. givone argues that in founding being on nothingness 
and thereby allowing beings to appear in their difference from being, as ‘not being 
nothing’,46 heidegger thereby establishes the possibility of freedom:
…precisely because to be ‘immersed in nothing’, dasein is always already beyond 
the entity, beyond the world …. to be immersed in nothing means to transcend 
… transcendence is freedom.47
But what happens if the nothing ceases to found being and instead becomes merely a 
manipulable element to be deployed, or a residual effect of rationalisation procedures? 
this effectively collapses the problem of the relation between the autonomy of the an-
tagonistic class subject into that of its organisation, since the subject is defined merely 
by its ability to effectively negotiate the formal rules of the multiplicity of languages and 
so cannot be an object of analysis independently of those formal rules. as negri argues 
in his review, the problem of the relation between class autonomy and its political or-
ganisation is not thereby resolved but merely exorcized by transferring autonomy to the 
ideological structures or language games/conventions and the level of its organisation 
is defined precisely by the effectiveness of those same formal structures. the truth of a 
language game or rationalisation procedure is given by the principle of efficacy that is 
determined by the level of organisation of the language game … i.e., by its efficacy. in 
negri’s words:
the complete sophism is: the guarantee of truth of organisation is given by the 
principle of reality that only that organisation can guarantee.48
autonomy collapses into organisation and organisation into effective management. for 
Cacciari, whether the working class or the capitalist class gains power is merely a ques-
tion of efficacy, of degrees of integration. 
     46. givone, Storia del nulla, p. 199.
     47. givone, Storia del nulla, p. 200.
     48. negri, La macchina tempo. Rompicapi Liberazione Costituzione, p. 48.
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Vii
what are we then to make of the usage of the negative in negri’s thought? in the small 
space that i have left, i can only hope to outline the skeleton of an alternative that i 
believe can be uncovered in negri’s writings. i shall attempt to summarize this in some 
baldly stated theses:
The question of  the nature and position of  the negative is the question of  politics: specific strug-
gles between classes determine the nature and position of the negative. Conversely, the 
question of the nature and position of the negative has concrete political effects, i.e. co-
determines particular relations between classes in struggle. how the negative is played 
out in struggles between classes—in the form of antagonism, contradiction, terror, or 
alternation49—is, therefore, intimately linked to the question of politics.
we have already seen that the question of foundation at issue in metaphysics cannot 
be understood independently of  the nature and position of  the negative. for the question of founda-
tion—so crucial to the history of metaphysics—is intimately related to that of the posi-
tion of the negative.50 
for negri, the question of metaphysics cannot be grasped independently of the 
question of politics—and vice versa. moreover, both the question of metaphysics and that 
of politics are intimately related to the question of the negative.
as a corollary to this: the question of  the nature and position of  the negative is the question of  
method. where ‘method’ is understood as immanent to the real, as a practice that is on-
tologically constitutive—politics as metaphysics as ontology: the ‘real movement which abol-
ishes the present state of things’.51 this is what negri means when he speaks of a method 
that 
…dispenses with all that remains of the exterior, gnoseological, and methodical 
connotations in order to become a substantial element, a constitutive key to the 
world. if this is a method, it is the method of being.52
for such a method involves situating the negative within the specific antagonism of class 
forces within a determinate, i.e. a concrete, social formation—and projecting the spe-
cificity of that antagonism, i.e. of the nature and position of the negative, into alternative 
standpoints of metaphysics and of politics. that is: 
when capital constitutes the political as the domination of one class by another, 
metaphysics is affected [subisce] by both poles of the relationship: it is the forces in 
     49. one fundamental contribution to the political function of the negative has been provided by mao, 
for whom the negative, or antagonism had to be comprehended in a complex interplay of principle and 
secondary ‘contradictions’. see for example the analysis in mao tse-tung, On the Correct Handling of  Contra-
dictions Among the People, Peking, foreign languages Press, 1957.
     50. for, in the history of metaphysics, being is always conceived in terms of the question of foundation, 
even when that foundation is entirely negative. in the words of giuseppe Cantarano, ‘the nothing has al-
ways supported the stability of being. the nothing [Das Grundlose of being] is the foundation of being’. see 
Cantarano, Immagini del nulla. La filosofia italiana contemporanea, p. 305.
     51. Karl marx and friedrich engels, The German Ideology, moscow, Progress Publishers, 1976.
     52. negri, The Savage Anomaly: The Power of  Spinoza’s Metaphysics and Politics, p. 150. also see antonio negri, 
L’anomalia selvaggia, milan, feltrinelli, 1981, p. 182.
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struggle that assume the sense of a metaphysical tradition and oppose it to another 
one…. a metaphysics, distinct metaphysical positions and the alternatives they 
represent are the most concrete of historical objects. they are ‘concrete’ because 
they are swollen [gonfio] with antagonisms and possibilities.53 
the history of the transformations of the nature and the position of the negative is 
the history of the antagonism between ‘blessed’ versus ‘damned’ metaphysics of which 
negri speaks in his spinoza book. thus, ultimately, it is the reflection of class struggle.
Viii
negri argues that the only way to concretize the negative, to not leave it entirely in the 
hands of the theorists of the mystical, is to conceive the negative as immanent to struggle, 
i.e. in terms of the specific characterisation of the negative within class struggle. But by 
so doing, does he not end up returning the negative to its subjection to the dialectical 
Aufhebungen and so to the development of Kapital-Geist or—at best—Kommunismus-Geist? 
for is the negative able to escape synthesis, i.e. does it not merely get resolved one way or 
another in the result (as is the case with determinate negation)? in either case, is not the 
result a final pacifying telos with all that it entails? that is, does not the negative become 
literally nothing, i.e. it is absent for it is always already accounted for, reduced, aufgehoben 
in the result, thus effectively repeating Parmenides’ inaugural gesture of the state tradi-
tion of metaphysics, whereby the source of all conflict is to be excised to leave us with 
the one?
Being is ungenerated and imperishable, entire, unique, unmoved and perfect; it 
never was nor will be, since it is now all together, one, indivisible.54
this, the ‘blessed’ tradition of state-thought, is the ancient but still active origin of bour-
geois thought.55 Contra Cacciari then, bourgeois thought is, rather, defined as one where 
the horizon of war is perpetually refused in favour of security, where the negative is ex-
cluded from the commonwealth, indeed where the commonwealth is entirely constituted 
by a foundational exclusion of the horizon of war. this is the fundamental problem 
of reactionary thought (hobbes per tutti). instead, negri wants to champion that other 
thread (of politics and of metaphysics), which views
…war as the fundamental and insuperable condition: where it is not a case of 
eliminating it but of making it function without precipitating into a simple massacre. 
instead, making it operate against the relations of production and in favour of the 
     53. antonio negri, ‘note sulla storia del politico in tronti’, L’anomalia selvaggia, milan, feltrinelli, 1981, p. 
290. the essay ‘note sulla storia del politico in tronti’ was published as an appendix to negri’s L’anomalia 
selvaggia along with another two short articles. 
     54. Parmenides and a. h. Coxon, The Fragments of  Parmenides: A Critical Text with Introduction, and Translation, 
the Ancient Testimonia and a Commentary, trans. a. h. Coxon, assen, Van gorcum, 1986, pp. 60-2, frag. 5.
     55. is this still active origin not evident even in that danger against which tronti cautions us, even as he 
proposes his notion of the autonomy of the political, as the ‘risk of a more organic relation [azione] between 
the state and capital, the danger of a formidable power-block that—at that point—could not be attacked 
and would be invincible’? quotation from tronti, Sull’autonomia del politico, p. 19.
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productive forces and their free expansion…. only by going back over the history 
of metaphysics, only by discriminating within it real alternatives do we have the 
possibility of contributing to the construction of new models for the refounding of 
class politics within antagonism.56
once again, we see that the nature and position of the negative is the question of poli-
tics. for how are we to conceive of this ‘within antagonism’, i.e. how are we to compre-
hend the nature and position of the negative in a way that leaves it open, without reso-
lution but without rendering it merely formal—without throwing us onto the mystical, 
and so opportunism, or back into the arms of the dialectic? this problem, i believe, is 
one that haunts negri’s thought for over four decades—from his writings on labour and 
the constitution, to his detailed work on the state-form, from his reappraisal of spinoza 
through to his most recent reflections on time and ontology. 
iX
negri gropes his way towards a solution to this apparently extremely abstract (i.e. theo-
retical) but—as we have seen—completely concrete (i.e. political) problem in the late 
1970s and early-to-mid 1980s. at this time, he argues that it is only by making the nega-
tive into an element of concrete practice and, therefore, ontologically substantial, that 
it can escape formalisation or auto-dissolution in a pacifying synthesis. the answer is 
not that negative thought must be rejected but that alone it is insufficient. in negative 
thought the negative is purely logical or ideological, i.e. it is parasitic upon that which it 
negates or, more precisely, its evacuation of all ontological foundation from what it cri-
tiques nevertheless enables the object of its critique to persist as the de-substantialized, 
de-ontologized form of languages and rationalities. since none of them are invented, 
they can at best be re-articulated. such an ideological negation is ideological in the 
strong sense: all that remains is ideology. thus, Cacciari’s negation allows the prolif-
eration of ideologies as it removes their material support. with the excision of the on-
tological referent, ideological struggle becomes entirely formalistic, opportunistic and 
divorced from the subjects of struggle. against Cacciari’s intentions (but not so far away 
from his recent practice), this appears to be an early anticipation of the political logic 
played out today in the contemporary discourses of ‘beyond left and right’ and ‘mod-
ernisation’—where to modernize is little more than to make adequate to the dominant 
conditions of accumulation and exploitation, while negating those conditions (ideologi-
cally). the fordist factory—at least in the west—hardly exists anymore. thus, as the 
current champions of the ‘beyond left and right’ argue, the referent, the space of exploi-
tation as well as its subject, no longer exist. exploitation is no longer a battleground, 
the battle today becomes the purely social one against ‘social exclusion’. Poverty is thus 
ascribed to individuals’ disconnection to a supposed space of possibility, of opportuni-
ty—an eminently ideological space from which the substantial ontological body of the 
exploited is excluded. what is demanded by the ‘modernizers’ is that the excluded be 
     56. negri, ‘note sulla storia del politico in tronti’, pp. 291-2.
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increasingly integrated into this rich space of possibility. the excluded must be able to 
learn and speak the different languages: ‘it is inexorable [inesorabile] to learn to play a lan-
guage if we want to experiment with its gaps, differences, limits and aporias …’.57 the 
specular double of thatcher’s ‘there is no such thing as society’ is the Blairite and Com-
munitarian claim that all that exists is society. the question is how individuals can be 
made to participate more fully, more inclusively.
is this so far from Cacciari’s claim, ‘[to have] power is to be integrated into the 
system’?58 
it is this logic that negri defies by ontologising the negative. subordinating philoso-
phy and practice to Krisis, to Das Grundlose of the foundation, fails to pit the negative 
against Power—to generate any antagonism that cannot be compromised by it—and 
so it remains prisoner to Power. as negri argues vociferously in various places in the 
mid-1970s, Krisis cannot be made to operate as motor or condition for a communist 
politics—for such a politics, this conception of the negative would forever subordinate it 
to the transcendence of Power. the ‘historic compromise’ proved an historic failure, as 
became increasingly evident in the course of the 1970s. the policy of the PCi became 
increasingly subordinate to that of the Christian democrats (dC) to the point that the 
dC increasingly excluded the PCi from the levers of power while drawing the PCi into 
the fierce repression and criminalisation of a large number of the extra-parliamentary 
left. subordination to the state became total. yes, the conflict was not resolved in a 
pacifying dialectical synthesis, but the un-synthesisable discourses of the PCi and dC 
became elements of a dispositif subordinated to the maintenance of a means to main-
tain the continuity of dialogue, i.e. of this ‘continuous confrontation’.59 Entrismo quickly 
became trasformismo.60 i seriously doubt negri knew just how prescient his critique of 
Cacciari in 1976 would be. 
nevertheless, the years spent in prison following the infamous ‘april 7th’ verdict, were 
an extraordinarily fertile period theoretically for negri and his endeavour to achieve a 
thought and practice of the negative that would integrate the lessons of negative thought 
while refusing the logic of integration and the correlative state-terrorist repression. it is 
interesting to see negri take up again his study of seventeenth-century philosophy after 
a decade. to his previous study of descartes (1970), negri now adds his influential study 
of spinoza. this may appear a strange way to approach the very pressing failure of 
communist (reformist and revolutionary) politics of the 1970s but negri emphasizes the 
timeliness of this study by titling one of the final sections of the book, ‘negative thought 
and Constitutive thought’.61 there he argues that, in contrast to descartes, spinoza 
refused to be satisfied with subordinating thought to its crisis and to de-ontologize the 
     57. Cacciari, ‘Critica della “autonomia” e problema del politico’, p. 127.
     58. Cacciari, Krisis. Saggio sulla crisi del pensiero negativo da Nietzsche a Wittgenstein, p. 66.
     59. Cacciari, ‘Critica della “autonomia” e problema del politico’, p. 133.
     60. the PCi’s attempt to find a point of entry into government through compromise with the dC resulted 
in the transformation of its policy into one of defence of governmentality.
     61. see chapter 9, § 1 of negri, L’anomalia selvaggia; negri, The Savage Anomaly: The Power of  Spinoza’s Meta-
physics and Politics.
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negative, and was able instead to give the negative its autonomy by turning it into an el-
ement of his ontology. so, against the ‘reformist’ strategy of descartes, negri postulates 
the constitutive and productive one of spinoza.62 negri’s strategy, then, is to suture nega-
tive to constitutive thought. it is to re-ontologize Krisis:
if dialectics cannot be conceived as the form by which determination is resolved,63 
if—nevertheless—the terms of a dialectical problematic remain, and finite elements 
oppose one another without encountering Aufhebungen, what shifts, passages, 
relations will the existent terms have to experience [che pure i termini dell’esistenza 
debbono conoscere] on the negative edge of this situation? Certainly, it is not a case of 
a logical sequence; there is no linearity given on this horizon of being. in contrast, 
we encounter ruptures, crises, and suffering. But all of  this is given within being, against 
an ontological backdrop that contains and relates these emergent elements [emergenze].64 
it is clear, then, even in 1984-85 when negri was completing his little-known but hugely 
significant book on leopardi, that he was still trying to find a way to insert crisis and 
negation into ontology and so refuse the logic of Das Grundlose of being. Politically, the 
failure represented by Cacciari’s Krisis was evident, and the 1980s and 1990s would only 
confirm the neutering of the negative once it is subordinated to the Political in terms of 
a ‘continuous confrontation’. theoretically, however, the problem remained. 
whilst accepting the rejection of the foundation that characterized negative thought, 
negri would refuse to either neuter the negative or allow it to be resolved ideologically 
through the ‘autonomy of the political’ —i.e. by de-ontologising it. instead, he would 
endeavour to turn it into an element for the production of new being:
…reality as origin [as archē]65 is negated and it presents itself instead as a creative 
surface. … there is only the revelation of the polarity of being and poetic 
subjectivity, within a relationship that negates every pre-existing reality and 
returns being to us as revolution, as radical transformation.66
in this way, ‘ontology becomes the science of the rupturing [rottura] of being’67—ontol-
ogy is the science of revolution; revolution is the practice of ontology. we could also say, 
therefore, that ontology becomes the science of the negative. thus, Krisis understood 
     62. see antonio negri, Descartes politico. Della ragionevole ideologia, milan, feltrinelli, 1970, antonio negri, 
The Political Descartes: Reason, Ideology, and the Bourgeois Project, trans. matteo mandarini and alberto toscano, 
london, Verso, 2007. in particular the ‘Postface to the english edition of The Political Descartes’.
     63. for hegel determination is, of course, negation—and vice versa, since in the terms of his dialectic, 
negation stops being abstract and formal because it is always a determinate negation. this must be borne 
in mind to understand the full import of refusing a dialectical resolution of the determinate. negri wants to 
maintain the concreteness of hegelian negation while refusing its insertion within the neutralising logic of 
dialectical synthesis—a difficult balance to maintain.
     64. antonio negri, Lenta ginestra. Saggio su Leopardi, milano, mimesis eterotopia, 2001 [1987], pp. 44, my 
emphysis. 
     65. when speaking of the origins of the greek word ‘archē’, reiner schürmann reminds us that ‘aristotle 
is the one who explicitly joins the more ancient sense of inception with that of domination’. see reiner schür-
mann, Heidegger on Being and Acting: From Principles to Anarchy, trans. Christine-marie gros, Bloomington, 
indiana university Press, 1987, p. 97. 
     66. negri, Lenta ginestra. Saggio su Leopardi, p. 154.
     67. negri, Lenta ginestra. Saggio su Leopardi, p. 167.
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as de-ontologisation of the negative is refused—nothing, negation is instead understood 
as the potentiality of being68 insofar as it refuses characterisation as stasis, constant capi-
tal, death. 
although negri cannot be said to have resolved these difficulties to his satisfaction 
or ours, his work has been crucial in bringing to light this pivotal problem for the de-
velopment of communist philosophy and politics. he also set out the markers that sepa-
rate his own endeavour from those who have attempted to trace back to heidegger the 
theoretical tools towards, if not a revolutionary, at least to a progressive politics. how 
pressing this problem remains for negri and for any of us who wish to be able to think 
the political, to think the negative, is summarized in a recent preface negri wrote to a 
book on deleuze by francesco lesce:
i believe that once all dialectical mediation is set aside, once heidegger’s hypostasis 
of being has been criticized, the problem of the negative reappears. how can one 
confront it inside, within, in the heart of materialist ontology? … the negative is 
consistent [consiste]. how can it be assumed, resolved, how can one suffer it and 
destroy it in a world without an outside? how can the painful consciousness of the 
negative be grasped within and against the positive reconciliations of being?69
these intractable questions continue to assail contemporary thought and demand theo-
retical, and—more importantly—practical resolution.
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